The voucher program failed largely because of government corruption, which led to a loss of public support. Reporter and Wall Street Journal editor Max Boot provides us with a longoverdue survey of the all too often slighted and neglected realm of these lesser conflicts. His work is of necessity an overview, but it is eminently readable and entertaining. Along the way, Boot reminds us that the conduct of these small conflicts is as much an "American way of war" as that which mobilizes and employs mass citizenarmies in protracted combat. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Boot suggests that many of the lessons learned from these small wars may be applied to the security dilemmas of today.
This work deserves praise on several levels. To begin with, Boot has rescued the history of these conflicts from a regrettable level of obscurity (as far as the general reading public is concerned). As the merits and limitations of the United States taking on the role of an imperial police force are increasingly debated, it is useful to recall that this is not the first time America has attempted to do so. The author has the courage to suggest that under certain conditions, imperial police forces may provide a much higher quality of life for indigenous people than would otherwise be possible. Boot notes that Haiti's greatest period of prosperity arguably occurred during its long occupation by the U.S. Marine Corps. He also points out that the Dominican Republic actually benefited when forcibly placed on a fiscal diet by the United States. Although the U.S. Marines were ensuring that nearly half the Dominican Republic's revenues went to repay foreign creditors, their honesty in disbursing the remainder was so notable that the country received more funds than it had under its own rulers. Boot also points out that Veracruz reached a record standard of cleanliness and hygiene, with an attendant improvement in public health, than it had known previously. Boot reminds us that far from resulting in quagmires of despair and failure, many of these conflicts have to be seen as U.S. successes.
There are, however, several criticisms that might potentially be leveled at this work. Some may say that like so many correspondents before him, Boot excessively admires the U.S. Marines, extolling their triumphs at the expense of the other services. However, while there is no denying that Boot has high regard for leathernecks, he does provide ample examples of Navy and Army actions. It is also important to remember that the Marines were the service of choice for the great majority of these conflicts. A significant portion of the Marines' senior leadership in the 1930s felt that the future of the Corps should be bound up in mastering the challenges of these conflicts. This resulted in the Marines' Small Wars Manual, published in 1941. It was later shelved; Boot believes that it would have benefited the United States in Vietnam had those in charge read the dusty tome.
Another criticism that might be made by some is that Boot glosses over the darker aspects of small wars, focusing on the successes and personalities. For example, the first charging of a serving flag officer with a war crime, the use of torture to extract information, and mutinies of such U.S. trained units as the Nicaraguan National Guard were part of the small-war experience. However, Boot discusses these events in clear and unequivocal terms, leaving the reader to come to grips with how these aspects of war played in U.S. successes.
What make this book so timely and one that should be read by almost anyone with an interest in political-military issues, are the tie-ins that Boot identifies as existing between the wars of the past and the realities of the present. Issues such as exit strategies, expected casualties, the difficulties of working with local allies, and the complexities of state building are not things the United States is facing for the first time. Indeed, as Boot demonstrates, the nation has been dealing with these dilemmas since the beginning of its existence. Well written, timely, and provocative, Savage Wars of Peace is well worth attention. RICHARD It would be difficult to find a book on world affairs more contrary to the opinions of most readers of the Naval War College Review or other members of the American national security community than Gore Vidal's Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace.
As a military officer myself, I disagree with many of Vidal's assumptions and
